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th, 2007 the European Union announced it would be giving Central America an aid 
package totaling 840 million Euros. Commissioner for EU External Relations Benita Ferrero-
Waldner said the aid package included an increment of 25% intended to help the Central 
American region in their integration efforts.  Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner reiterated the EU’s 
continued commitment to help the Central American countries achieve political and social 
stability through democracy, justice, security, while fighting poverty and protecting the 
environment.
1
  The EU’s aid package presented to Central America is just another in a long series of 
development aid that the EU has given to the region. Historically the EU has been the largest aid 
donor in the region and has been the main proponent of Central American integration. Central 
America attempted integration back in 1824, shortly after the nations achieved independence, but 
it was short lived and was dissolved in 1848.  A second attempt at integration was sought in the 
1960s in what would have been the first Latin American customs union.
2 This ambitious goal was 
backed by the then six members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and was named 
the Central American Common Market (CACM). The CACM was envisioned as the ideal tool for 
the integration of the five Central American countries which were expected to rapidly 
industrialize and develop. 
 
The CACM as an Instrument for Integration 
  
The CACM was formed to meet the objective of rapid industrialization by the sharing of net 
benefits by all members. Industrialization was thought would reduce the dependence of the 
countries from the rest of the world and increase wages. However it was easier said than done. 
The Central American economies were not close to being called industrialized and in order for 
the wonders of industrialization to take place, policy instruments needed to be set in place and 
there needed to be a reallocation of resources.  
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  3  The first decade of the CACM was considered a great success both inside and outside of 
the region. Intraregional exports reached almost $300 million in 1970.
3 Trade was mostly 
concentrated in manufactured goods, and for the first time the Central American countries seemed 
to be modernizing with several multinational corporations setting up shop in the region. Several 
institutions were created to oversee the progress and aid those countries that were weaker like 
Honduras and Nicaragua. Yet as successful as the first decade seemed to be several problems 
were brewing and would soon surface. 
  The second and third decades of the CACM (1970-1980) brought with them a string of 
problems relating to trade inefficiencies, the international economy, and conflict within the 
region. The end of the 60s left the countries dealing with trade and fiscal issues that affected 
competitiveness within the region. To worsen matters a territorial dispute began between 
Honduras and El Salvador in July, 1969. The so called “soccer war” did not last long but had 
lasting effects on the economic dynamics of the region. Honduras refused to trade with El 
Salvador hurting attempts for further integration. Towards the end of the 1970s the Somoza 
government began to crumble in Nicaragua, and a leftist movement gained popularity in El 
Salvador. In 1981 Honduras and El Salvador finally reached an agreement over their dispute and 
commercial relations slowly began to normalize.
4 Just as prospects for integration began to seem 
hopeful and the CACM seemed to once again gain momentum the countries were halted in a 
decade that would prove to be their worst yet.  
  The 1980s brought with them a period of conflict and economic instability that was 
devastating for the region. The Central American countries began to default on the loans they had 
taken from the developed countries when kick starting their economies. The international debt 
crisis, as it came to be known, affected many countries throughout the world sending the world’s 
economy into a recession. To worsen matters civil war erupted in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua, changing the focus of the region from trade and integration into a militarized frame of 
mind. In this context of war, economic crisis, and militarization, the region saw its intraregional 
trade fall drastically to 1970 rates.
5
  All these factors combined proved too devastating to the CACM. By 1985 intraregional 
exports had fallen by more than half. The Central American political crisis ruled out any attempts 
to revive the integration process. Several outsiders pointed out to the CACM as the culprit for the 
turmoil in the region, many began to see it as the problem instead of the solution.  
 
 
Another Attempt at Reviving the CACM 
  
During the mid 80s another attempt to revive the CACM was made. It was difficult to lift it up 
from the ground mainly because of political unrest that was still prevalent in the region. Tension 
between the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the other Central American governments 
made the notion of integration seem impossible. International institutions such as the World Bank 
were also opposing the new attempt to integrate arguing it would return the region to import 
substitution policies which were largely blamed for the economic maladies the region 
experienced at the beginning of the 80s.
6 The United States was also not keen on the idea of 
Central American integration, thinking it would enable the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua to 
garner support in the other countries.  
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  4  The collapse of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in 1990 cleared the path for the 
true revival of the CACM. The Central American presidents met in Antigua, Guatemala, in June 
of 1990 to revitalize the CACM. It was agreed that the CACM would not be the same as it was 
conceived back in 1960, while integration was still accepted as the way for rapid economic 
growth the focus of the common market shifted. Instead of the economies concentrating on 
import substitution policies and domestic regional trade, they would support an outward growth 
model based on the promotion of non-traditional exports. 
7 The following year the leaders met in 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras and signed the Protocol of Tegucigalpa its main feature was the creation 
of the Sistema de Integratión Centroamericana (SICA). Then in 1993 the 14
th presidential 
summit was held and the Protocol of Guatemala was signed. The protocol’s main objective was to 
update the treaty that launched the CACM in 1960 and re-establish the common export tariff 
(CET) with a ceiling of 20%.
8 This goal proved unrealistic to reach due to short term 
macroeconomic conditions.  
  The rapid intraregional growth of the 1990s reversed negative thoughts dating back to the 
crisis of the 80s. A high level of optimism pushed governments to embark on many projects that 
could not realistically be completed. In 1994 the Central American Presidents adopted the 
Alianza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (ALIDES), but environmental protection continued to lack 
the financial funding needed to take on any significant projects. Later in 1995 during the 16
th 
presidential summit the Treaty of Central American Social Integration was sign but there was no 
defined explanation of how the CACM would alleviate the region’s social problems much less 
resolve them.
9 After many critical reviews from international agencies, the Central American 
Presidents decided during their meeting in 1997 that SICA would be given the leading role for the 
implementation of most integration projects and most of the regional organizations were 
transferred to San Salvador. However, the Central American Parliament was allowed to remain in 
Guatemala and the Court of Justice in Nicaragua but their budgets were sharply reduced.   
  The process of transforming the Central American region from an inward looking scheme 
to an outward orientated one was still far from complete and much remained to be done. A source 
of major concern was and has continued to be the case of Costa Rica. Costa Rica is the region’s 
most successful economy but it has been reluctant to fully participate in all of the integration 
projects. Costa Rica did not feel any obligation to join in creating a CET in the 1990s. It was 
against and would not consider the prospect of free labor movement. It stayed outside of the 
Triángulo del Norte formed by Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras whose main goal was to 
create a true common market. Costa Rica made it clear to all the other Central American 
countries that it would pursue bilateral agreements with any country it wanted and did with 
Mexico in 1994 complicating the prospects of a true customs union in Central America.
10  
  The main initiatives of the new CACM have been directed at restoring the two essential 
instruments of a customs union namely free intraregional trade and the CET. Progress has been 
made in regards to customs procedures and legislation. This was mainly pushed by the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. There has been a process of 
modernization of the Central American customs, this has enabled an expedient process of trading 
procedures as well as better methods and controls of goods entering and leaving the countries. 
Regulations have been standardized and there is now a Central American Uniform Customs 
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9 Bulmer-Thomas, V. The Central American Common Market: From Closed to Open Regionalism. World 
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Challenges for Central American Integration 
 
Fernando Rueda–Junquera
12 points out seven challenges and weaknesses that are preventing the 
successful integration of the Central American countries into a true common market. The first 
shortcoming of the region is predominance of extra-regional trade. A true common market such 
as the EU reports intraregional trade of both exports and imports of more than 60%, while 
intraregional trade in Central America has only accounted for nearly 26% of exports and 13% of 
imports. In order for development to take place through integration, Rueda-Junquera explains 
there has to be an expansion of intraregional trade through the removal of non-tariff barriers and 
effective liberalization of trade throughout the region wishing to integrate. Closely linked to the 
first shortcoming is the second which is the slow improvement in the quality of intraregional 
trade. Quality of trade once again seems to be greater extra regionally rather than intra regionally. 
The CACM did improve intra regional trade since the beginning of the 1990s but at a slow pace 
that was not strong enough to invigorate it or counterbalance the extra regional trade effects 
promoted by the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the CAFTA. With trade liberalization there 
is a need for proper infrastructure and an appropriate level of investment in order for regional 
productive resources to be maximized.  
 
  A third problem facing successful integration has to do with distributive issues of costs 
and benefits. This problem is affecting the lesser developed countries of Central America, namely 
Nicaragua and Honduras. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala account for nearly 85% of 
exports intra regionally, mostly between Guatemala and El Salvador. The prospect of a true 
common market turning into a reality would seem to only significantly benefit those countries 
that are already enjoying trade with each other while pushing the other countries to the periphery. 
This translates into a big problem for successful integration because if all countries cannot see a 
benefit to joining the common market they won’t. The absence of a real common trade policy is a 
fourth challenge facing the region, Rueda-Junquera points to the lack of a common customs 
administration, limited coordination of macroeconomic policies, and weak regional institutions as 
being three other issues that must be addressed in order for successful integration to happen.  
 
 
EU Prospects for Central America 
 
The relationship between the European Union and Central America in the context of the San Jose 
Dialogue can be traced back over two decades to 1984. The process was launched on September 
28
th in Costa Rica and has been called by the EU one of its most successful relationships with any 
sub-region of the world. The main goal of the San Jose Dialogue is to extend peace, democracy, 
security, and economic and social development.
13  
  The EU has seen Central America as a region that can benefit from the same process of 
integration that it once pursued. The pursuit of peace and stability through co-operation and 
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  6collective security while achieving economic integration has been diagnosed by the EU as a 
possible solution to Central America’s underdevelopment and instability.  
  The San Jose Dialogue has served as the cornerstone for relations between the two 
regions. The EU was able to foster the peace accords in Guatemala and El Salvador taking 
advantage of its position as a neutral actor. Unlike the U.S. the EU was not perceived as a power 
that would use force or break international law in order to pursue its objectives. Its prolonged 
absence from the Central American scene made it less responsible than the U.S. for the 
circumstances that were affecting the region.
14 Because of its key role in the pacification of the 
region, the EU has established a high degree of political credibility in the region which it has used 
to promote regional integration. 
  In relation to trade, the EU is the regions second most important trade partner trailing 
behind the U.S. EU investment has grown significantly during the past decade. Commercial 
relations are governed by the drugs-regime of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
which is considered one of the main pillars of EU-CA relations. The GSP provides duty free 
access into its market to 90% of Central American exports.
15 The focus on trade was conceived as 
a way to combat drug production and trafficking while promoting European investment in the 
region. Economic cooperation has been a constant part of the dialogue since its inception. During 
the Madrid Summit of 2002 the EU confirmed its position of creating a path for a future 
Association Agreement that would include free trade between the Central American countries and 
the EU with the prospects of deepening integration in Central America. The EU’s intention was 
again stated during the Guadalajara Summit held on May, 2004, and furthered during the Vienna 
Summit that took place on May, 2006. During the Vienna Summit the Heads of State and 
Government of the EU and Central America reaffirmed their pledge to strengthen their 
relationship. Building on the concepts set forth during the San Jose Dialogue, both regions 
admitted that their continued relationship had helped the Central American countries in their 
pursuit of economic and social development, integration, and democracy and peace building. 
Furthermore, both regions agreed to continue building on the prospect of a future Association 
Agreement that would include the creation of a Free Trade Area.
16  
  Central America receives most of its developmental aid from the EU. The EU contributes 
some 60%
17 of the total assistance development aid that the region is given. The Central 
American sub-region received the largest share of absolute and per capita co-operation from the 
EU. This co-operation has traditionally been directed towards programs relating to human rights 
and democracy, as well as disaster prevention and reconstruction, rural development, social 
development, and regional integration.  
  Taking its own experience as a model, the EU’s strategy for Central American 
cooperation and integration functions on the basis of three main principles.
18 The first is to 
promote regional integration, implement common policies and reinforce regional institutions. The 
CACM is the main project under this principle and it is hoped it will be the cornerstone of the 
integration process. The EU both regionally and bilaterally has supported economic cooperation 
programs which seek to improve competitiveness in regional and international markets in order to 
attract investment and assist in the transfer of technology. In regards to institutions the EU seeks 
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  7to consolidate technical and administrative capabilities so they can successfully play their 
corresponding roles in the region. 
  The role of civil society in the integration process is an aspect that the EU deems highly 
important and is the second priority in its strategy for Central America. In order for successful 
integration to take place, national societies must be involved in the process and share in it. The 
lack of information and appropriate participation by societies and the fact that benefits are not 
sufficiently visible have been identified as major weaknesses in the integration process. The EU 
strategy seeks to encourage awareness rising among Central American societies in order to garner 
the political impetus needed to re launch the regional integration process in Central America by 
educating people about the economic and sustainable development benefits integration can offer.  
  Because of its geography and topography, Central America has always suffered from 
natural disasters. Because of its vulnerability several initiatives have been taken to improve 
natural disaster prevention and a common legal framework. The EU has allocated over 74.5 
million Euro towards the Democratization and Human Rights Programme, the European 
Community Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO) natural disaster prevention programs,
19 and 
activities intended to fight crime and drug trafficking.  
 
 
The Future of Central American Integration 
 
There are many factors impeding the successful integration of the Central American isthmus. The 
objectives have changed from the inception of the CACM in 1960s. The region has been able to 
change its focus from industrialization to export led growth, as a result trade liberalization has 
been implemented and external tariffs have been reduced drastically. The new regional 
integration scheme did bring some success and intraregional exports did grow although not 
significantly. But this may no longer be such a drawback since the new goal of regional 
integration has now shifted to the international competitiveness of firms, as well as the 
development of an environment that attracts foreign investment. 
  The challenges earlier delineated show that the path to Central American integration will 
not be easy if ever possible. On the one hand there is Costa Rica who repeatedly has 
demonstrated its desire to seek bilateral agreements with third countries rendering the possibility 
of a true CACM with a genuine CET virtually impossible. On the other hand there is the problem 
of the institutional framework being too weak to accomplish significant goals towards integration. 
Several Central American leaders have called for the complete dissolution of the Central 
American Parliament (PARLACEN) and the Court of Justice on the basis of their inability to 
demonstrate their reason for being and the high cost of running them which has turned into a 
burden for the countries.
20  
  Despite the obvious challenges facing Central American integration the EU reiterated its 
continuous support for the process during the last Ministerial Meeting of the San Jose Dialogue 
process that was held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic on April, 2007. During this 
meeting EU representatives reaffirmed their support for the creation of an Association Agreement 
between the two regions which includes a free trade agreement.
21 The strategy for Central 
America was approved for the period of 2007-2013 and was given a budget increase with the 
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  8hopes of deepening integration within the region towards the prospect of the future Association 
Agreement between the two regions.  
  After several failed attempts to create a common market that would seem could cure 
many of Central America’s problems the EU has continuously supported any attempt that would 
encourage integration. The European model of integration has proven so successful that it would 
seem the ideal prescription for those underdeveloped nations to finally join and together rise from 
poverty towards a globalized world where they could compete as a bloc. However successful 
integration of independent countries is easier said than done, and most are not in the same 
circumstances Europe was post World War II. What served for one region may not be the 
ultimate solution for another. The Central American countries will have to keep trying to work 
together and find a way to reconcile their differences while taking advantage of their common 
heritage, proximity, and of being part of a region that is seen as a whole.  
 
 
  9